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The employment relationship of local government senior council officers has undergone 
fundamental changes largely replacing tenured with fixed term contract employment. 
Many students of public management have argued that the employment of senior council 
officers on a performance contract basis would cause their loyalty to shift from the 
community to councillors. This paper reports the results of a survey of senior council 
officers conducted across Australia which focused upon council officers’ perceptions 
concerning the nature of their employment and the values they adopt in guiding their 
behaviour in relation to councillors. 
The responses of senior council officers show that although most of them are 
appointed on fixed term performance contracts they never the less perceive that their 
employment is quite secure. Council officers do not take upon themselves the role of 
unelected guardians of the public interest. Neither do they respond to the unlawful 
demands of councillors.  The officers surveyed display neutral behaviour wherein they 
respect their vow of silence, implement council policies even if they consider that they are 
against community interest and they balance community considerations and political 
considerations in their advice to councillors. They adopt this behaviour despite their 
belief that councillors are quite influential in deciding almost all aspects of their 




The employment relationship of local government senior council officers has undergone 
fundamental change with fixed term contract employment largely replacing tenure. Many 
students of public management have argued that the employment of senior council officers on 
a performance contract basis would result in their loyalty to shifting from the community to 
councillors. This paper presents the results of a survey of senior council officers conducted 
across Australia which focused upon council officers’ perceptions concerning the nature of 
their employment and the values they adopt in guiding their behaviour in relation to 
councillors. 
 
Current State of Research on Council Officer Values 
 
Most Australian studies of local government have concentrated on their structural aspects (see 
Advisory Council for Inter- Government Relations, 1984; Richards, 1989; Albin, 1995), on 
human resource management aspects (see National Review of Local Government Labour 
Markets, 1989; Howard, 1988; Office of Local Government, Department of Immigration, 
Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, 1989; Libby, 1989) and reforms in local governments 
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(Aullich, 1995; Tucker, 1997). Almost no empirical studies exist on the public service values 
of local government managers in Australia. However, in the United Kingdom, Pratchett and 
Wingfield (1996) completed a multi-dimensional study of public service values in local 
government.  Their conceptual schema has provided a basis for this paper to build upon and 
further refine (see Pratchett and Wingfield, 1996). 
Their have been a significant number of studies on public service values in the USA 
local government sector.  Felts and Schumann (1997) examined the extent of local managers’ 
participation in the political process whilst Jurkiewicz, Massey and Brown (1998), compared 
the level of motivation between public (local government) and private sector managers. 
Jurkiewicz and Massey (1997) compared motivational factors between supervisory and non-
supervisory municipal employees, while Gabris and Simo (1995) compared the level of 
‘public service motivation’ among municipal, non-profit and private sector employees.  
Menzel (1993) studied coping strategies of local government managers faced with 
‘corrpution’ related ethical dilemmas and Menzel (1995) studied the ethical environment of 
local government managers. In a further study, Berman, West and Cava (1994) compared 




This paper focuses on the values of local government senior officers in the context of fixed 
term contract employment. The employment relationship within local government in 
Australia has undergone fundamental changes in recent decades. Although the States vary in 
terms of the extent to which they have done away with tenured employment for their senior 
council officers, most of them have by and large implemented fixed term contract 
employment in various degrees (Aulich, 1995: 95). Senior council officers are mostly 
appointed on performance based fixed term contracts. These contracts are renewable after a 
certain specified time and they are subject to renewal upon satisfactory performance. 
Performance contracts have also lead to the detailed identification of the functions and 
activities of various senior positions in local government and the systematic performance 
evaluation of senior officers on an annual basis. 
Many scholars have argued that fixed term contract employment has the potential to 
take the loyalty of public managers away from serving the community interests to serving the 
interests of councillors (Considine, 1988; Parker, 1989; Thompson, 1991). For example, as 
early as the 1960’s, Parker (1961) stated that politicians must get the fullest and frankest 
advice from their public servants and implied this was  the main reason for the security and 
permanence of public employment – to give them time to become expert advisers and 
freedom to become courageous advisers. (Parker, 1961: 302) 
More recently this focus on serving the interests of councillors or politicians was 
articulated at the Commonwealth Government level by Tony Ayers (Head of the Department 
of Defence). He stated that public managers are ‘paid to give ministers the advice they ought 
to hear and not what they wanted to hear and that the risk was that when people believed they 
could be sacked without any apparent reason and without need, they tend to get the advice 
ministers want to hear’ (Windsor, 1996).  However there is hardly any empirical evidence to 
support either viewpoint. Neither is there any baseline data to suggest the nature of the values 
which guide the behaviour of council officers in their relationship with councillors.  In the 
context of these limitations, this paper reports on: 
 
• the level of perceived employment security among senior council officers 
• the values that senior council officers adopt in their relationship with councillors; 
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• whether the current senior officer employment relationship has influenced the values they 




Before discussing the method of data collection used in this study, the key concepts of 




Security of employment is a complex concept involving many components. For example, 
legal conditions of employment may not be reflective of the actual feeling about security of 
employment. However, it cannot be denied that legal security plays a significant part in one’s 
perception of employment.  Employment security is also a matter of perception and has been 
defined as the perceived stability and continuance of one’s employment as one knows it 
(Probst, 2002: 146). 
This research has assessed perceived security of employment of senior officers on a 
number of components. The first component is the legal situation of employment: whether a 
senior officer’s employment is continuing or based on fixed term contract. The second 
component is perceived threat and the possibility of losing one’s employment. The third 
component assesses the extent of power a manager has to counteract the threat of losing one’s 
employment. For example, those who are low in power may perceive high levels of 
employment insecurity. The fourth component is the importance of employment to a manager 
(Ashford et al., 1989: 804-805). A manager who places a higher level of importance on their 
job is likely to be more ‘responsive’ to councillors’ demands. Based on previous research 
(Pullin and Haidar, 2003) conducted in Victoria, a fifth component addresses a manager’s 
options in finding other employment if current employment is lost. A manager who sees high 
probability in finding another employment is likely to be less ‘responsive’ to councillors’ 
demands. 
 
Senior Council Officer Values 
In order to examine the values senior council officer adopt in their relationship with 
councillors we have identified three main dimensions. They are object of obedience, 
partisanship and anonymity. Based on these three dimensions, three ideal type (Weber, 1949) 
behaviour patterns labelled neutral, responsive and trustee have been identified (Table 1). 




Dimension and Pattern of Ideal Type Behaviour 
 
Dimensions Patterns 
 Neutral Trustee Responsive 
Object of 
Obedience 
Lawful demands of 
elected official 
The public interest Elected official 
Partisanship Non-Partisan The public interest To elected official 
Anonymity Anonymous Not-Anonymous to public 
interest concerns 
Not-Anonymous to 
elected official concerns 
 
In the context of ideal types (Table 1), neutral public managers obey the law and their 
political superiors conditional upon the latter acting within the law (Armstrong, 1989, 
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Quinlan, 1993). They are non-partisan, ‘party neutral’ but not ‘politically neutered’ (Uhr, 
1987: 22) in their dealings with political superiors. Neutrality implies a division of role 
between public managers and political superiors, where public managers participate in the 
policy process by providing honest and frank advice. In doing so they take into account the 
goals of political superiors, the policy merits and the public interest. Public managers may 
vary in adopting neutrality values. Some may actively persuade politicians to adopt their 
recommendations while others may consider their job of advice finished with the provision of 
advice (Keating, 1990). They faithfully implement lawful policies and instructions decided by 
political superiors, even if they do not agree with them (Heclo, 1975; Spann, 1973; 
Thompson, 1985). In this relationship public managers are anonymous; they do not make 
public comments or divulge information except with proper authorisation from or on behalf of 
political superiors (Williams, 1985; Kernaghan, 1976). 
Public managers following the ‘trustee’ value-pattern see society or the public as the 
ultimate object of obedience. They are non-partisan in relation to political parties but see 
themselves as ‘non-elected trustees’ of the sovereign power. They exercise that power ‘with 
special sensitivity to the public interest’ (Buchanan, 1975: 426). Trustees serve their superiors 
so long as the latter work for the public interest (Jackson, 1988: 247). They promote the 
public interest in their advice, only implement policies consistent with the public interest and 
resist policies that are not. Their resistance includes speaking out against mistaken policies, 
leaking information, whistle blowing, and even secret white-anting from within if necessary 
(Jackson, 1988). Jackson argues that ‘there are occasions when leaking information serves the 
public interest. Leaking may always be illegal but it is not always unethical or immoral’ 
(1988: 248). Public managers who subscribe to the trustee value-pattern forsake anonymity to 
promote the public interest. 
Responsive public managers also obey their political superiors. However, they do not 
confine themselves ‘to the letter and spirit of existing law’ but are ‘committed believers who 
would go about doing whatever was necessary to achieve [their superiors’] policy goals’ 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 1994: 466). Responsive public managers provide advice and 
information that support their superiors’ policy objectives. In this pursuit they might suppress 
adverse information and even ‘cook’ data to further the interests of their superiors (Rourke, 
1992: 545). It follows that responsive public managers eschew anonymity and would not 
hesitate to make public comments and manage information to increase support for the policies 
and goals of their superiors. This describes a public manager who agrees with ideologies of 
their political superiors and responds to the unlawful demands of politicians on their own 
volition. Studies of public managers in Malaysia suggested that there could be a variation in 
responsive behaviour (Haidar et al., 2004). In this situation council officers respond to the 
unreasonable demands of councillors only under pressure not on their own volition. They may 
give in to the pressures of politicians but only reluctantly. 
 
Method of Data Collection 
 
Data for this study has been collected with a questionnaire survey. The population for this 
study comprises all council officers in the 652 councils in Australia’s five states and Northern 
Territory. This list was supplied by Local Government Managers Australia (LGMA). Of this 
population, 20 per cent were selected as the sample population which yielded 137 councils 
and approximately 650 council officers. Of the 650 surveys mailed out, 141 surveys were 
returned resulting in a 20.3 per cent response rate. The sample is stratified to take account of 
variations by state and territory and by metropolitan and rural/regional councils. 
The survey instrument examines the nature of the employment relationship of senior 
officers and their values. Several research instruments were utilised to develop the 
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questionnaire for this study: the section relating to employment is adapted from (Probst, 2002; 
Probst, 2003; Ashford et al., 1989) and the section relating to values has been developed by 
the researchers, tested and revised from previous studies (Haidar et al., 2004; Pullin and 
Haidar, 2003). 
In most cases the questionnaire used a five point Likert type scale that was sensitive to 
subtle attitude changes (Zikmund, 1997: 345). For example, respondents were given five 
choices: strongly agree, agree, undecided, disagree and strongly disagree. For some parts of 
the questionnaire respondents were asked to state their responses in a scale that included such 
terms as likely, highly likely not likely not at all likely rather than in absolutes. For the 
purposes of this paper, responses are in dichotomous terms eg. agree and disagree, however, 




Responses were roughly proportional to the number of councils in states, that is more 
responses were received from states with more councils. Responses from rural and urban 
municipalities are quite balanced. In terms of educational background the table shows that a 
majority of council officers in the survey possess under graduate and post graduate education. 
Quite a few of the officers have master level qualification. Majority of respondents have more 
than 11 years of experience as council officers. Officers with less than five years experience 
constitute little over 16 per cent. This suggests that most respondents have at least more than 
five years experience as council officers which make their responses highly reliable. Whilst 
respondents are experienced there is also a balance in terms of age distribution. The most 
striking aspect of the data is the gender category, where there is an over-representation of 




The results of our survey concerning employment conditions and job security are presented in 
Table 2. Only a small minority of senior officers report that their jobs are tenured. 
Overwhelming majority of senior officers report that they are employed under fixed term 
contracts which means that their jobs are at least legally insecure. This also means that their 
employment contracts are subject to renewal on a periodic basis with a possibility that they 
may lose their employment. 
 
Table 2 
Level of perceived job security 
 
 Likely % Unlikely % Neither % 
Looking to the future what is the probability that you 
may lose your employment 
9.2 70.9 19.9 
If you lose your current employment what is the 
probability that you would get another employment 
87.9 5.0 7.1 
 Agree Disagree Neither 
I understand this organisation well enough to prevent 
negative things happening to my employment 
66.6 8.5 24.8 
I would do anything to keep my employment 4.9 75.9 19.1 
 Continuing Fixed term 
contract 
Others 
My employment is 24.1 75.2 0.07 
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However, this legal situation regarding senior council officer employment presents a 
deceptive picture because the majority of the public officers perceive that their jobs are in 
reality quite secure. For example almost 71 per cent of senior officers report that it is unlikely 
that they would lose their employment although they are employed under fixed term 
contracts. The probability of finding another employment and their possession of power to 
stop negative things happening to their employment makes them even more secure in their 
employment. As Table 2 shows, almost 88 per cent of the senior council officers perceive that 
they would have little difficulty in finding other employment if they lost their current 
employment. In addition to this almost 67 per cent of senior council officers believe that they 
are powerful enough to stop negative things happening to their employment. This perception 
of high level of overall security in their employment must be one of the major explanations in 
almost 76 per cent of the senior council officers reporting that they would not do just about 
anything to keep their employment. In summary, it can reasonably be concluded that although 
majority of senior council officer reported that they are employed under fixed contracts, they 
perceive that their employment is quite secure. 
 
Trustees of the Community Interest 
 
The values senior council officers adopt has been profiled on three patterns - trustee, neutral 
and responsive. The first part of the report discusses whether senior council officers view 




Are they Trustees? 
 




Make unauthorised public comment about council policies 
that are not in the community interest. 
3.5 94.3 2.1 
Disclose unauthorised information about council policies that 
are not in the community interest. 
3.5 95.0 1.4 
Hide official information about council policies that are in the 
community interest. 
4.3 92.1 3.6 
Only implement council policies that are in favour of the 
community interest. 
7.8 82.9 9.3 
Only consider the public interest when providing policy advice 
to council. 
27.1 65.0 7.9 
Having provided my policy advice I actively persuade 
councillors to adopt policy recommendations that I believe 
best serves the community interest. 
78.6 16.4 5.0 
 
Senior council officer responses to all questions unequivocally indicate that they do not see 
themselves as trustees of the community. For example, their responses to the first three 
questions indicate that majority would not make unauthorised public comment nor would they 
disclose unauthorised information nor hide official information even if they believe that such 
actions would promote community interest.  Almost 83 per cent of the senior council officers 
would not hesitate to implement council policies that are not in favour of the community 
interest. Their response to statement five indicates that to the majority (65%) of council 
officers, community interest is not the only consideration in their advice to councillors. 
However, whatever advice they provide, a large majority would actively persuade councillors 
to adopt policies that they believe serves the community interest. 
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These results are similar to those found in several studies in the USA.  Jurkiewicz and 
Massey (1997) in a study of local government managers in the departments of public works, 
fire, police and administration of five municipalities situated in the Mid-western metropolitan 
area in the USA found that ‘municipal employees are more concerned with job security, 
salary, and opportunities for personal and professional advancement than they are with 
benefiting society, teamwork, or autonomy’ (367). They report that ‘Chance to benefit 
society’ was ranked 7th by supervisory and 10th from among 15 motivational factors by non-
supervisory level municipal employees (Jurkiewicz and Massey, 1997, 370). 
In a later comparative study of employees in public including local government and 
private sector, Jurkiewicz and others (1998) found that  ‘private sector employees assign a 
higher rank to ‘chance to benefit society’ than do their public sector counterparts’ (236) and 
the authors comment that the ‘ethic of public service’ has gone to the private sector (245). In a 
comparative study of managers of municipal, non-profit, and private companies, Gabris and 
Simo (1995) found that public managers work in the public sector ‘because it represents a 
presumably secure job that satisfies basic extrinsic needs, rather than because it ameliorates a 
vague intrinsic need for serving the public’ (41). 
Similar findings have also been reported from studies of managers at state and federal 
levels in the USA. Public managers compared to private sector managers have been found to 
have less ‘job involvement’ (Buchanan (1974, 1975) less ‘work involvement’ (Emmet and 
Taher, 1992: 46; Yeager, Rabin and Vocino, 1982: 407). However, there are also other studies 
at federal and state levels in the USA where public managers have been found to have placed 
lower importance to monetary incentive and higher importance to work that is worthwhile to 
society (Rainey, 1992: 288; Posner and Schimdt, 1996: 281; Kilpatrick, Cummings and 
Jennings, 1964 in Bozeman, 1987: 19)1. 
 
Responsiveness to Councillors 
 
The question then is if they do not adopt trustee values; do they adopt responsive values. As 
has been argued above, managers can be responsive to councillors willingly or under 
pressure. Managers are responsive willingly when they agree with ideologies and values of 
councillors. First we assess whether they are responsive willingly 
 
Table 4 
Are they Responsive Willingly? 
 




Make unauthorised public comment in support of the political 
interests of councillors. 
1.4 95.7 2.9 
Disclose unauthorised information in support of the political 
interests of councillors. 
0.7 98.6 0.7 
Hide official information which could damage the political 
interests of councillors. 
1.4 90.0 8.6 
Only implement policies that promote the political interests of 
councillors. 
1.4 95.7 2.9 
Frame and limit my policy advice to suit the political interests 
of councillors. 
1.4 96.4 2.1 
 
Senior council officer responsiveness to the whims and unlawful demands of councillors has 
been assessed with five statements. The answer is quite unequivocal as Table 4 shows. More 
than 90 per cent of senior council officers in all their responses to the questions indicate that 
they would not breach their vow of silence in support of councillors, nor do they promote 
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political interests of councillors in the implementation of council policies nor do they restrict 
their policy advice to promote the political interest of councillors. If they are not responsive 
willingly, do the council officers give in when councillors ask them to do things that are 
unlawful or unreasonable? 
 
Table 5 
Are they Responsive Reluctantly? 
 




Make unauthorised public comments when I am under 
pressure from councillors to do so. 
1.4 95.0 3.6 
Disclose unauthorised information when I am under pressure 
from councillors to do so. 
1.4 95.7 2.9 
Hide official information when I am under pressure from 
councillors to do so. 
2.1 92.1 5.7 
Implement unlawful requests from councillors when I am 
under pressure from councillors to do so. 
2.1 97.1 0.7 
Frame and limit policy advice to suit the political interests of 
councillors when I am under pressure from councillors to do 
so. 
2.1 92.9 5.0 
 
Table 5 shows that responses of the senior council officers surveyed are even more 
unequivocal in their disagreement. More than 92 per cent of our respondents disagreed with 
all five questions that assessed whether they give in to the pressures of councillors to do 
unlawful acts.  The overwhelming majority of senior council officers report that they do not 
breach their vow of silence nor do they entertain unlawful requests from councillors in the 
implementation of council policies nor do they restrict their policy advice to promote the 
political interest of councillors even when they are under pressure from councillors.  
 
Neutrality and Senior Council Officers 
 
Respondents indicate that they are neither completely trustees nor are they responsive (to 




Are they Neutral? 
 
 Agree % Disagree % Undecided 
% 
Never make unauthorised public comment even if council 
policies are against the community interest. 
87.0 6.5 6.5 
Never make unauthorised disclosure of official information. 86.9 7.2 5.8 
Hide information when the law requires me to do so. 50.2 24.6 24.6 
Implement all legally constituted council policies, even if they 
are against the public interest. 
79.0 7.2 13.8 
Consider both the public interest and the political interests of 
councillors when providing policy advice to council. 
65.2 28.7 6.5 
Having provided my policy advice I do not really care 
whether councillors accept my recommendations or not. 
37.2 51.4 11.4 
 
Senior council officers’ adoption of neutral behaviour has been assessed with six statements 
(Table 6). Their responses to statement one to four clearly indicate that they adopt a behaviour 
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that is lawful. The strongest possible expression of their neutral behaviour is demonstrated by 
their agreement with the statement four where they agreed that they implement all legally 
constituted policies even if they are against public interest. The majority of council officers 
also report that they consider both public interest and the political interest of councillors in 
their advice to councillors. This is quite consistent with their statement 5 in Table 3 where 
they say that public interest is not their only consideration in providing policy advice to 
councillors. Responses of officer to statement 6 in Table 6 and their responses to question six 
in Table 3 are also quite consistent. In their responses to these two statements they are saying 
that they do their best to persuade councillors to adopt a policy that they believe is conducive 
to community interest. 
Felts and Schumann (1997) in a study of local government administrators in South 
Carolina found that ‘administrators do not see themselves as political actors, per se, 
exercising political discretion by making choices. Rather they opt for a more neutral and 
perhaps a safe role. They regard their role in a more limited way, that is providing additional 
technical information to those they see enmeshed in a conflict’ (367). Maranto and Skelley 
(1992) in a study of public managers of the Washington offices of 15 federal organisations 
representing defense, regulatory and social welfare found that ‘…adherence to the neutral 
competency notion appears to be almost universal and not dependent on organisation’s 
cultures and the policies they support’ (178). Career public servants expressed the belief that 
they ‘should accept the direction of political appointees even if they disagree with it’ 
(Maranto and Skelley, 1992: 176). The felt that they should ‘voice objections in-house first. If 
this is not possible, they should probably seek another work assignment or position, or even 
‘run for office’ ‘(Maranto and Skelley, 1992: 177). Majority of career officials think that it is 
‘improper to leak controversial administration initiatives to interest groups or congress’ 




Council officers are not completely trustees nor are they responsive to councillors. Indeed, 
they are anything but responsive to the unlawful demands of councillors. Council officers 
demonstrate neutrality values. They adopt these values despite the fact that most of them are 
appointed on fixed term legal contracts. There are several possible explanations of these 
findings. One explanation that is supported by the current study is that council officers can 
afford not to be responsive because they perceive that they are quite secure in their jobs. 
Although the majority reported that they are employed under fixed term legal contracts which 
mean that there is no guarantee in the continuation of their employment, they do not believe 
that they would lose their employment. Moreover, they believe that they would almost 
certainly find other employment if they lose their current employment. This perception of 
security of employment is at least one of the explanations behind officers not adopting 
responsive behaviour. 
Maranto and Skelley (1992) pointed out, based on Wamsley et al. (1990), that the 
neutrality principle persists because ‘it confirms the obvious - a division of labour - in public 
service between careerists (defined in terms of time, profession, and service) and the political 
appointee’ (42).  Furthermore, Helco (1977) identifies that neutrality persists because it is 
fundamental to what is called the ‘civil service idea’. The neutrality ethic draws a sharp 
distinction between the managers and councillors and provides public managers with ‘identity 
and uniqueness’ (in Maranto and Skelley, 1992: 184). 
The neutrality ethic is a prudent principle from the self-interest perspective of public 
managers. A manager with neutrality orientation can hold on to a job longer than a responsive 
manager or a trustee as the neutral manager can continue working for many political groups 
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while a responsive manager or a trustee can only work for a political group that agrees with 
his or her views and attitudes. Neutrality as an ideal is ‘more understandable and functional 
for career executives than other ideals such as ‘public service’ or ‘public interest’’ (Maranto 
and Skelley, 1992: 184). Neutral managers, by distancing themselves from ready 
identification with any particular group and from intrigues, can ‘preserve their reputation for 
indispensable competence and fairness’ (Caiden, 1996: 21). The performance contract system 
may in fact reinforce a neutrality ethic. Managers following a neutrality ethic may be more 
likely to have their contracts renewed despite changes associated with regular electoral cycles. 
The neutrality ethic as Caiden argued also fits in with certain personality types and for 
them it has remained a ‘beguiling idea’. Principles of neutrality ethic fit very well with people 
who prefer not to take risks, hate practical politics and yet desire comfort, security, and 
upward mobility (Caiden, 1996: 22-23). Politicians are the people who take risks and engage 
in the political gamble but when running governments they need the ‘neutral’ manager who 




Many authors have argued that recent changes in the public sector employment relationship 
are likely to negatively affect the trustee ethic among public managers. Given the lack of 
major research in the area, it is difficult to comment.  A study of council officer values in 
Victoria Australia does not support such a relationship (Pullin and Haidar, 2003). Two other 
studies indicate only a very weak or no relationship between these two variables. Weller and 
Wanna (1997) found that changes to the employment relationship at the commonwealth level 
in Australia have not really affected the standard and level of advice that commonwealth 
public managers provide to their ministers (22). Romzek (1985) in a study of 484 federal, 
state and local government employees in the USA report that ‘job security’ is not strongly 
related to ‘organisational involvement’ on the part of public servants (287). 
However, one must ask a more fundamental question: is there a relationship at all 
between nature of the employment relationship and the values public managers adopt in their 
working relationship with ruling politicians? Many argue that the employment of public 
managers on fixed term contracts would make them responsive to councillors. Our data does 
not support such an association. One could argue that there is no logical association between 
them either  (Clark, 1959).  The claim that there is an association between the nature of 
employment on the one hand and the values of managers on the other is too simplistic because 
the values public servants adopt in this relationship are likely to be influenced by a range of 
other factors including personality, ethnicity, upbringing and religious background 




1. Rainey cautioned that ‘service motivation’ i.e. the duty to serve public interest may only be 
distantly related to such concepts as motivation, ‘reward preferences’, ‘levels of organisational 
involvement’ or ‘organisational commitment’, job involvement, professionalism, altruism, or 
pro-social behaviour. He argued that these concepts may even clash with the concept of public 
service motivation (1992: 298-99). 
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